American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Contributions to Books

Scholarship & Research

2012

Efficiency in Bello and Ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too
Easy?
Kenneth Anderson
American University, Washington College of Law, kanders@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_bk_contributions
Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anderson, Kenneth, "Efficiency in Bello and Ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too Easy?" (2012).
Contributions to Books. 122.
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_bk_contributions/122

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Contributions to Books by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more
information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

14
EFFICIENCY IN BELLO AND AD BELLUM:
MAKING THE USE OF FORCE TOO EASY?
Kenneth Anderson

I. Introduction
Targeted killing by means of drone warfare has been the subject of much criticism
over the past decade, particularly as the United States has increased its pace, intensity, and geographic range since the Obama Administration took oﬃce in 2009.
The criticisms range widely in their complaints. They include claims that civilian
deaths are excessive and disproportionate; “blowback” and resentment in Pakistan
and other places produces more terrorists and fighters in the future; drone warfare
“de-humanizes” warfare and creates a “Playstation” mentality toward killing; targeting decisions lack transparency and legal standards, particularly with regard
to strikes undertaken by the CIA; secret strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and beyond
violate international law; targeted killing outside of a conventional battlefield constitutes extrajudicial execution and violates international human rights law; and
many more.
Some of these criticisms are essentially factual in nature, while others are normative claims from law or morality. The claim of excessive civilian deaths—a claim
that figures centrally in many of the normative arguments—depends upon facts
that are highly contested. Some observers, especially European activists, say that
the civilian deaths run in the hundreds or even thousands. The CIA and the U.S.
government, by contrast, insist that the civilian death toll amounts to scores over
all the years of targeted killing using drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that
the rate of civilian deaths continues to decline, year by year, even as the number of
strikes increases, due to improved technology and intelligence. The activists and
campaigners look for their numbers in local reports from the remote and inaccessible (to Western outsiders) places in Pakistan’s border regions. The U.S. government
responds that those reports are uncorroborated by Western journalists, typically
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exaggerated or wrong, and sometimes manipulated by Taliban or Pakistani military intelligence.
Beyond that factual argument, a general criticism can be leveled against the U.S.
government for refusing to be more forthcoming about its targeted killing and
drone warfare programs. The U.S. government says (frequently in leaks to the press
that preclude eﬀective public discussion) that its claims of extraordinary precision
and low collateral damage levels should be believed, but then oﬀers no independent
proof on which to do so. The U.S. government (were it not in the position of oﬀering no oﬃcial comment) could reply that even apparently innocuous revelations
on collateral damage amounts to handing the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other hostile
groups provide invaluable intelligence on how the United States conducts these
operations. Broadly speaking, even the arguments over transparency and accountability, however, come down mostly to factual questions. If the United States is
right regarding collateral damage, that says one thing. If the activist critics are
right, it says another. But these are largely arguments about facts on the ground.
In this chapter, I propose to set aside these factual arguments and instead take
certain factual premises by assumption. My purpose is to focus instead upon an
argument over targeted killing using drones in which, importantly, the form of
argument itself is at issue. The bare-bones argument is the following. Targeted killing using drone warfareis immoral because, by removing the personal risk to those
carrying out these operations, the drone-wielding actor has no, or much reduced,
disincentives against using force. Using force when your own people are not at risk
in the operation makes using force “too easy” an option.
The argument comes in several diﬀerent forms, with levels of detail, sophistication,
and formality. Perhaps the simplest version is that oﬀered by a campaigning lawyer, who said, “The problem with drones is that they remove the burden of having
to fight one’s way on the ground to the target, and so remove the constraints of
geography and personal risk in warfare, so increasing the temptation to make war.”
Another version says that, since such attacks cause civilian casualties, reducing
the personal risk to the drone-using forces increases civilian casualties that would
not otherwise occur—even if they are still relatively small—and this is unjust.
Still another version goes so far as to accept that drones might reduce, rather than
increase civilian casualties—but the very fact of decreasing civilian casualties
increases the propensity to use force in the first place, and this is a bad idea.
Versions of this general argument about drones are widely circulated in the press
and literature about U.S. counterterrorism; those of us who participate in academic and policy conferences about drones and targeted killing find them to be
an oft-repeated trope. Many of the references appear to trace back to comments
in Brookings scholar Peter Singer’s path-breaking book, Wired for War, and later
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a widely noticed 2009 article by New Yorker writer Jane Mayer. The prominent
British computer scientist Noel Sharkey also brought these arguments to public
awareness in articles in The Guardian. Versions of them were repeated in a recent
U.K. Ministry of Defence report on robotics and drone warfare. Whatever precisely the version of the argument, however, or by whomever oﬀered, the final
conclusion is typically that drones make war “too easy.”
The factual and normative claims are often closely associated with criticisms of
drones based on aﬀective claims, claims about the emotions of drone operators
and targeters, on the one hand, or those in the targeting zone, whether targets or
civilians, on the other. The aﬀective criticisms include the supposed de-personalization of war by drones and a supposed de-sensitization toward violence on the
part of drone operators. This is a claim about the aﬀective consequences of the
remoteness of the weapon platform and its operators from the place of killing, and
not only solely the lack of personal risk for the operators. This was vividly spelled
out in a Newsweek Article in which a CIA oﬃcer describes how he would watch
these killings live on a monitor while sitting comfortably in his oﬃce.1 Sometimes
these criticisms lead to a diﬀerent kind of criticism. Virtuous warfighters are somehow obligated to view each death, including those of acknowledged enemies, who
threaten American soldiers or as terrorists, Americans generally, as “regrettable.”
So, in that case, it would be unseemly for U.S. personnel to cheer a drone attack
upon a fleeing terrorist, because that would show callous indiﬀerence to human
life; the proper attitude is regret even in killing an enemy who might, if not killed,
be engaged in killing Americans.
The attitude of “remoteness” that is called for in the name of virtue seems to me
quite morally unjustified. Indeed, it is that form of remoteness, the idea that one
refuses to address the question of “sides” in war in the name of pure abstraction,
which seems to me a much more problematic form of “remoteness,” not remoteness
in launching the missile from a physically remote place. But the proper balance of
attitude and aﬀect in the honorable and just warrior, as between the emotions of
partiality and impartiality, carry us far afield into questions of virtue ethics that I
will not address here.
Aﬀective arguments often hint, nonetheless—even if inchoately— that war without personal risk is unchivalrous and dishonorable. It is a point that has featured
in “blowback” criticisms—critiques of targeted killing using drones that argue it
is counterproductive because of the resentment it produces among populations
in Pakistan and elsewhere. As a psychological proposition, it is perhaps unsurprisingly featured in fictional literature about the war on terror—perhaps most
1
Tara McKelvey, “Inside the Killing Machine,” Newsweek, February 13, 2011 <http://www.
thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html> accessed November
4, 2011
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prominently in Blood Money, the recent thriller written by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.2 It has been raised by many pundits—LA Times columnist Doyle McManus, for example3 —and is a core critique for counterinsurgency
experts such as Andrew Exum or David Kilcullen, who believe that targeted killing using drones is an aﬀectively wrong strategy because anonymous, invisible,
and impersonal “death from above,” as it were, works against winning hearts and
minds of local populations on the ground.4
The surface framing of these many and jumbled versions of the “too easy” argument against drones hints at buried premises. This chapter proposes to examine
some of these buried premises. At bottom, however, I want to urge that there is
something wrong with the conceptual form of this argument, in which a successful strategy in war turns out to be immoral, not because of the damage it causes
achieving its success, but because success itself increases the propensity to do it
too much. The problem is not with the argument that even a successful strategy
can lead to unintended consequences of its own success—including the tendency
to overuse it. True, one ought to view such criticisms of success with considerable
skepticism—does one really want to proceed from a heuristic of “whatever you do,
avoid success because you might overdo it?” It seems better to acknowledge that,
at most, such criticism is a “second-order” problem, if a problem at all. The fundamental problem with this argument does not lie there.
It lies instead with the fundamental idea that drones make the resort to force and
violence—war—“too easy.” Attractive on the surface, it is not a coherent notion as
applied in war. The most interesting and important version of the argument goes so
far as to frame this as a matter of creating an “ineﬃcient” level of disincentive to use
of force on account of insuﬃcient risks to one’s own forces in so doing—appealing
deliberately to the apparatus of welfare-maximization and cost-benefit analysis.
That there is an “ineﬃcient” level of incentive to use violence presumes, however,
that there is in principle an “eﬃcient” one. I will argue that this is conceptually
faulty.
I believe this to be a bad argument, not so much on account of faulty factual
premises about drones and targeted killing, but primarily on account of faulty
reasoning about the place and role of “eﬃciency” in thinking about the resort to
force. But whether I am right or wrong on this point, the argument is nonetheless
of intrinsic interest because it involves an important and overlooked intertwining
David Ignatius, Blood Money (W.W. Norton Publishing, 2011).
Doyle McManus, “U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan ‘backfiring,’ Congress told,” LA Times, May
03, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/opinion/oe-mcmanus3> accessed November
3, 2011.
4
David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NY
Times, May 16, 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html> accessed
November 3, 2011.
2
3
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of two strands of the ethics of war, the rules governing the conduct of war (jus in
bello) and the rules governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum). There is intrinsic
interest to the argument that the “eﬃciency” of jus in bello might create “ineﬃciency” of jus ad bellum.
To be clear at the outset, the argument criticized here is the universal argument
that makes claims about either morality or eﬃciency for all parties taken together—the two acknowledged sides as well as the civilians on both sides. It needs to
be distinguished from a distinct debate over targeted killing using drones that is
essentially strategic and runs to one side’s interests only. David Ignatius, for example, has been arguing in a series of influential columns in the Washington Post that
the United States is “addicted” to drones because they make it “too easy” to decide
to attack in many places.5
This sounds very much like the argument that this chapter critiques, but Ignatius
and others making this assertion are not making a claim about the morality or
eﬃciency of drones on a universal ground. The claim, rather, is that considered
only with respect to its own strategic interests, the United States overuses drones.
Ignatius’ claim is roughly that, as a matter of U.S. counterterrorism strategy (morality or universal welfare eﬃciency aside, just as a matter of U.S. strategy), the problem with drones is that they are tactically precise, but strategically incontinent. I
believe that claim is incorrect, but it is essentially a factual question, and not the
argument under consideration here.
The order of discussion is as follows. First, I set out several key factual assumptions
about drone warfare, precision targeting, and civilian collateral damage. These
assumptions are set against a background discussion of the nature of the drone
campaign and targeted killing as currently conducted by the United States. The
key descriptive point is to disentangle the technology of drone warfare from the
practice of targeted killing; the two are not always linked, and are not the same
thing or always aimed at the same strategic goal. Second, I set out the form of the
argument that I propose to critique in what—given the factual assumptions—I
take to be its most plausible, but also most sophisticated and interesting conceptual
form. The essential task here is to unpack the intuition lying behind the oft-heard
phrase in this context, drones make war “too easy.” Third, I critique the web of conceptual assumptions that underlie the very idea that there is a coherent way to talk
about drones making war “too easy”—which is to say, some notion of an “eﬃcient”
level of war that could make sense of saying that it is either “too easy” or “too hard.”
Fourth, assuming that the critique oﬀered of the notion of an “eﬃcient” level of the
resort to force—war—is good, I finally turn to oﬀer a speculative and incomplete
5
David Ignatius, “The Price of Becoming Addicted to Drones,” Washington Post, September
22,
2011
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-price-of-becoming-addicted-todrones/2011/09/21/gIQAovp41K_story.html> accessed November 3, 2011.
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account of why that would be so. Here, I will argue that war turns on the nature of
“sides” that do not share commensurable grounds that would allow the commonality required to find an “eﬃcient” point in a universal welfare sense.

II. Disentangling targeted killing and drone warfare
Although targeted killing and drone warfare are often closely connected, they are
not the same and are not always associated with each other. We need to disaggregate the practices of targeted killing from the technologies of drone warfare.
Targeted killing consists of using deadly force, characterized by the identification
of and then strike against an individual marked to be killed. It is distinguished,
among other things, by making an individualized determination of a person to be
killed, rather than simply identifying, for example, a mass of enemy combatants to
attack as a whole. Since it is a practice that involves the determination of an identified person, rather than a mass of armed and obvious combatants, it is a use of force
that is by its function integrated with intelligence work, whether the intelligence
actors involved are uniformed military or a civilian agency such as the CIA.
Targeted killing might (and does) take place in the course of conventional warfare,
through special operations or other mechanisms that narrowly focus operations
through intelligence. But it might also take place outside of a conventional conflict, or perhaps far from the conventional battlefields of that conflict, suﬃciently
so operationally, to best be understood as its own operational category of the use
of force—“intelligence-driven,” often covert, and sometimes non-military intelligence agency use of force, typically aimed at “high value” targets in global counterterrorism operations. It might be covert or it might not—but it will be driven
by intelligence, because of necessity it must identify and justify the choice of target
(on operational grounds, because resources are limited; or legal grounds; or, in
practice, both).
Targeted killing might use a variety of tactical methods by which to carry out the
attack. The method might be by drones firing missiles—the focus of discussion
here. But targeted killing—assassination, generically—is a very old method for
using force and drones are new. Targeted killing in current military and CIA doctrine might, and often does, take place with covert civilian intelligence agents or
military special operations forces—a human team carrying out the attack, rather
than a drone aircraft operated from a distance. The bin Laden raid exemplifies the
human team-conducted targeted killing, of course, and in today’s tactical environment, the United States often uses combined operations that have available both
human teams and drones, to be deployed according to circumstances.
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Targeted killing is thus a tactic that might be carried out either by drones or human
teams. If there are two ways to do targeted killing, there are also two functions for
the use of drones—targeted killing as part of an “intelligence-driven” discrete use
of force, on the one hand, and a role (really, roles) in conventional warfare. Drones
have a role in an ever-increasing range of military operations that have no connection to “targeted killing.” For many reasons ranging from cost-eﬀectiveness to
mission-eﬀectiveness, drones are becoming more ramified in their uses in military
operations, and will certainly become more so. This is true starting with their
fundamental use in surveillance, but it is also true when they are used as weapons
platforms.
From the standpoint of conventional military operations and ordinary battlefields,
drones are seen by the military as simply an alternative air weapons platform. One
might use an over-the-horizon manned aircraft—or, depending on circumstances,
one might instead use a drone as the weapons platform. It might be a missile
launched from a drone by an operator, whether sitting in a vehicle near the fighting
or farther away; it might be a weapon fired from a helicopter 20 miles away, but
invisible to the fighters; it might be a missile fired from a U.S. Navy vessel hundreds of miles away by personnel sitting at a console deep inside the ship. Future
air-to-air fighter aircraft systems are very likely to be remotely piloted, in order to
take advantage of superior maneuverability and greater stresses endurable without
a human pilot. Remotely-piloted aircraft are the future of much military and, for
that matter, civil aviation; this is a technological revolution that is taking place for
reasons having less to do with military aviation than general changes in aviation
technology.
Missiles fired from a remotely-piloted standoﬀ platform present the same legal
issues as any other weapons system—the law of war categories of necessity, distinction and proportionality in targeting. To military professionals, therefore, the
emphasis placed on “remoteness” from violence of drone weapons operators, and
presumed psychological diﬀerences in operators versus pilots, is misplaced and
indeed mystifying. Navy personnel firing missiles from ships are typically just as
remote from the fighting, and yet one does not hear complaints about their indifference to violence and their “Playstation,” push-button approach to war. Air Force
pilots more often than not fire from remote aircraft; pilots involved in the bombing campaign over Serbia in the Kosovo war sometimes flew in bombers taking
oﬀ from the United States; bomber crews dropped their loads from high altitudes,
guided by computer, with little connection to the “battlefield” and little conception at what they—or their targeting computers—were aiming. Some of the crews
in interviews described spending the flights of many hours at a time, flying from
the Midwest and back, as a good chance to study for classes they were taking—
not Playstation, but study hall. In many respects, the development of new sensor
technologies make the pilots, targeters, and the now-extensive staﬀ involved in a
380
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decision to fire a weapon from a drone far more aware of what is taking place at
the target than other forms of remote targeting, from Navy ships or high altitude
bombing (but presumably the bombers did not drop their loads until they were
over the battlefield, although they were very high over it).
Very few of the actors on a technologically advanced battlefield are personally
present in a way that makes the destruction and killing truly personal—and that
is part of the point. Fighting up close and personal, according to the critics’ psychological theories, seems to mean that it has greater significance to the actors and
therefore leads to greater restraint. That is extremely unlikely and contrary to the
experience of U.S. warfighters; lawful kinetic violence is more likely to increase
when force protection is an issue and overuse of force is more likely to increase
when forces are under personal pressure and risk. The U.S. military has known
since Vietnam at least that increased safety for fighting personnel allows them
greater latitude in using force, encourages and permits greater willingness to consider the least damaging alternatives, and that putting violence at a remove reduces
the passions and fears of war and allows a coolly professional consideration of what
kinds, and how much, violence is required to accomplish a lawful military mission. Remote weapon systems, whether robotic or simply missiles launched from
a safe distance, in U.S. doctrine are more than just a means for reducing risk to
forces—they are an integral part of the means of allowing more time to consider
less harmful alternatives.
This is an important point, given that drones today are being used for tasks that
involve much greater uses of force than individualized targeted killing. Drones are
used today, and with increasing frequency, to kill whole masses of enemy columns
of Taliban fighters on the Pakistan border—in a way that would otherwise be carried out by manned attack aircraft. This is not targeted killing; this is conventional
war operation. It is most easily framed in terms of the abstract strategic division
of counterinsurgency from counterterrorism (though in practice the two are not
so distinct). In particular, drones are being deployed in the AfPak conflict as a
counterinsurgency means of going after Taliban in their safe haven camps on the
Pakistan side of the border. A fundamental tenet of counterinsurgency is that the
safe havens have to be ended, and this has meant targeting much larger contingents
of Taliban fighters than previously understood in the “targeted killing” deployment. This could be—and in some circumstances today is—being done by the
military; it is also done by the CIA under orders of the President partly because of
purely political concerns; much of it today seems to be a combined operation of
military and CIA.
Whoever conducts it and whatever legal issues it might raise, the point is that this
activity is fundamentally counterinsurgency. The fighters are targeted in much
larger numbers in the camps than would be the case in “targeted killing,” and
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this is a good instance of how targeted killing and drone warfare need to be differentiated. The targets are not individuated, either in the act of targeting or in
the decision of who and where to target: This is simply an alternative air platform
for doing what might otherwise be done with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, or
ground attack, in the course of conventional counterinsurgency operations. But it
also means that the numbers killed in such operations are much larger, and consist
often of ordinary fighters who would otherwise pile into trucks and cross back into
Afghanistan, rather than individualized “high value” targets, whether Taliban or
Al Qaeda.
Disentangling targeted killing (whether by drones or human teams) from drone
warfare (whether for targeted killing or conventional warfare) is important because
the argument upon which this chapter focuses goes to the category of targeted
killing by means of drones. It depends upon a factual assumption about the civilian consequences of targeted killing using drones; upon a further fact about the
reduced risk to U.S. personnel in such operations; and about a supposed implication for the incentives or, more precisely, supposedly reduced disincentives to resort
to violence under those two conditions. But it is therefore not about targeted killing using human teams; and it is likewise not about drones used for conventional
warfare.

III. An assumption about civilian casualties and collateral damage
The undefended factual assumption of this argument is that targeted killing
using drones results in significantly—vastly—less collateral damage and civilian
deaths than other forms of attack. The alternatives include other forms of attack
from manned attack aircraft, or attack by human special operations teams on the
ground. It is true that there would presumably be no collateral damage if no attack
were carried out at all, but that alters the fundamental question beyond recognition. This chapter takes that assumption as given and does not defend it, but it
is worth saying something as to why this is a plausible and, at this date, the best
assumption regarding civilian harm from targeted killing using drones.
The main approaches to collateral damage from targeted killing using drones in
Afghanistan and Pakistan are three: first, various European campaigning groups
purport to report using local sources, such as Pakistani newspapers and local
media or governmental statements. Second, two American groups—with notably
distinct political tendencies, the generally liberal New America Foundation and
the generally conservative Long War Journal6 (Bill Roggio of the Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies)—have each been estimating strikes and apparent
6

<http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php> accessed November 3, 2011.
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civilian casualties since the mid-2000s. Third, although the U.S. government does
not comment openly on CIA operations or other secret strikes, senior oﬃcials have
made anonymous comments to reporters, but more recently directly on the record,
on what the U.S. claims are the levels of civilian casualties.
The general lines of those three, at this writing, can be summarized thus. The
European campaigning groups suggest hundreds to thousands of civilian casualties
over the decade that the United States has been engaged in such strikes. The New
America Foundation7 and the Long War Journal have separately estimated civilian casualties in the various hundreds; their evaluations today suggest that despite
sharply escalating levels of strikes, the rate of civilian casualties has been declining
in the last two years. The U.S. government has oﬀered estimates, nearly all oﬀ the
record, of a hyperbolic “zero” to civilian casualties in the two (sometimes said to be
low two) digits.8 Some important notes on what counts in these attempts at tabulation are required. First, outsiders do not have direct, ground level access to strike
locales, and so casualty counts are very much a function of local reports, which everyone grants carry much possibility of exaggeration or propaganda manipulation.
It is not even clear the extent to which U.S. intelligence has access to on the ground
reports; it seems to rely heavily on continued Predator drone air surveillance to
see what happens on the ground following a strike to determine who was killed,
though it might well have intelligence assets on the ground as well.9
In my opinion as an informed (though entirely outside the government) observer,
the truth of the matter is likely higher than the U.S. government says, and unquestionably higher than its lowest (zero) estimate—but at most in the low hundreds, if
not high two digits. If that is so, certainly I would endorse what former CIA director Leon Panetta has said about this technology—“It is the most accurate weapon
system in the history of warfare.” That is so, frankly, even if the numbers are the
higher, earlier estimates given by the American monitors. (For what it is worth, I
do not give much credence to the European campaigners’ estimates, though they
are politically influential in various quarters, but even those estimates, compared
to the history of civilian deaths in war, represent a very considerable improvement.
This is not intended as a legal judgment as to proportionality, which would require
many separate considerations. The point, rather, is that these technologies are making targeting in war more precise on any historical measure, and criticizing them on
a snapshot basis—your technology killed civilians, it’s another war crime—rather
than on their historical trend line, the horrors of urban battles in the Second World
<http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones> accessed November 3, 2011.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/aug/11/civilian-victims-ciadrones> accessed November 3, 2011.
9
For more on the trustworthiness of these numbers, see Gregory McNeal, “Are Targeted Killings
Unlawful? A Case Study in Empirical Claims without Empirical Evidence” in this Volume, ch.
12.
7
8
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War as a baseline, seems to me morally indefensible. One should be encouraging
improvements that will necessarily be incremental and over a long time.)
Second, understanding the separate roles of drones in targeted killing of individually identified terrorist targets as part of counterterrorism, on the one hand,
and conventional counterinsurgency warfare targeting cross-border safe havens,
camps, and columns of mass groups of Taliban fighters, on the other, is important
in interpreting any of these estimates. The groups attempting to estimate numbers
do not seek to disaggregate these roles, and thus total numbers killed might well
go up or down significantly as a function of conventional combat in Afghanistan,
not as a result of counterterrorism operations. Targeted killing using drones in the
sense meant in this discussion is illustrated by an attack upon an Al Qaeda commander in the Pakistan border areas, not necessarily connected to Afghanistan
Taliban operations or the safe haven camps for fighters but instead, for example,
a person with a planning role for operations to be carried out abroad. But with
respect to counting casualties, that Al Qaeda counterterrorism target is more likely
to be surrounded with civilians, whether explicitly as human shields or not, than
fighters in the camps or in transit across the Afghan border. The ratio of civilians
to Al Qaeda target killed might be high, even though the total number of people
is small in absolute terms; by contrast, an attack upon a camp might easily have no
genuine civilian killed, but may kill large numbers of fighters in absolute terms.
Add to that a third dimension of the value of the target—high value taken as an
individual in the targeted killing of the Al Qaeda commander in counterterrorism;
low value taken individually in the case of any individual Taliban fighter, but high
value taken altogether as a fighting force in counterinsurgency.
These considerations indicate that the aggregate numbers of killed, civilians or
targeted persons, for drone operations sometimes reported in the press and by
monitors such as Long War Journal or the New America Foundation, do not tell
us everything about casualty numbers that we need to know, particularly as the
uses of drones ramify—as these monitors would be the first to agree (they have
been admirably transparent as to the limitations of the methodology). Reporting
on casualties from drone warfare is not the same as reporting on casualties from
targeted killing as such. It is unclear whether the leaked statements about casualties
from the CIA refer only to CIA strikes, and only to strikes carried out as genuine
targeted killing. This is a very significant ambiguity in the statements, of course.
Hence the granular diﬀerences matter.
The assumption of this chapter, therefore, is that targeted killing using drone technologies is significantly more discriminating and sparing of collateral damage to
civilians and their property than alternative uses of force to the same end would
be. That is so whether the actor is the military in conventional operations, military
special forces, the CIA, or combined special operations. I happen to think that
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proposition is true and that it is becoming more so over time—an indication of
the importance of allowing incremental improvements in weapons systems, rather
than smothering the technological baby at birth. I also think the perception of
greater precision leading to fewer civilian casualties is increasing even among skeptics of targeted killing using drones, including some of the human rights monitors,
who today appear to be hanging back from full-on criticism of the technology
and its possibilities. The fact of NATO having urgently requested, and received,
Predator drones as attack platforms in the Libya conflict has also apparently had
an eﬀect. After the outbreak of the NATO air war, Qaddafi’s forces quickly abandoned their tanks and heavy equipment, as NATO promptly targeted them with
conventional aircraft, to mingle with civilians in ways that made locating them
much more diﬃcult.
Drones were first used to help identify targets in Libya—the surveillance role for
which Predators were originally designed, with long loiter times over the battlefield (hours compared to precious minutes). But NATO quickly determined that
it was both more eﬀective and safer for civilians if the drones undertook the strike
as quickly as possible, rather than waiting for manned aircraft to arrive. This role
of drone aircraft in a “humanitarian” war seems to have put drones in a somewhat
diﬀerent light from how they appear—“anonymous death from the skies”—to
their critics in Afghanistan and Pakistan, though without any particularly logical
reason why it should be so, and appear to have done something to “bless” drones as
more acceptable than they were. It has not escaped attention that drones are a near
perfect weapon of humanitarian intervention if there is an associated force on the
ground—one’s own troops are not at risk, and yet, at least in Libya, the war is not
entirely an (oft-indecisive) air war, either. Of course, consonant with the burden
of this chapter, what might be seen as a “feature” of drones—they do not put riskaverse humanitarian interveners at risk—might just as easily be seen as the “bug”
of this chapter—they make armed humanitarian intervention “too easy.”
Speaking to the broad future of the technology, however, and given the direction
of technology and cost, it appears inevitable that drones will take on many more
operational roles over time, whether in conventional war, special operations, and
what has here been called generically “intelligence-driven uses of force.” Drones
will likely evolve—as aircraft, as well as in the weapons and sensor systems they
bear—into many specialized types. They will get both bigger and smaller than
they are now, for example, and they will surely evolve into those specialized for
surveillance and those specialized to fire weapons. And they will also surely evolve
into those specialized in high-value, “intelligence-driven” targeted killing of individuals and those that are suited to conventional operations. Bearing in mind these
increasingly varied uses is essential to understanding, when it comes to targeted
killing and/or drone warfare, that one-size-fits-all legal analysis is not suﬃcient.

385

15_Altman_Ch14.indd 385

12/2/2011 5:00:17 PM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeted Killings
One last background observation on the nature of targeted killing through drone
warfare. Beyond technology, success in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and anywhere
beyond, depends crucially upon on-the-ground intelligence long before any
Predator is launched. It is an underappreciated point—very underappreciated. The
United States has invested many years in the past decade of war in Afghanistan in
establishing its own intelligence network on the ground that is able to supply information with respect to both counterinsurgency operations on both sides of the
border, as well as with counterterrorism activities and targeting inside Pakistan.
This has taken years, and, particularly during the last five years, the CIA has been
the lead agency. This is a reason why the CIA, rather than the military, is tasked
with much of the drone use in the border areas of Pakistan; it has the intelligence
networks. This is also a source of irritation to the Pakistani government, which is
no longer able to steer US targeting and intelligence activities.
But the precision of strikes with respect to civilian casualties, and also the ability
to determine who the United States should target and ensure that this is the person
actually being targeted by a drone, is a function of the CIA’s intelligence capabilities on the ground, integrating a human network together with signals intelligence.
This was the background that led to the successful bin Laden raid in 2011—and
a key source of the Pakistani government’s chagrin, that the United States did
not need it and would possibly have been compromised in the operation. It is also
instructive to compare the diﬃculties of the Libya air campaign, even with weaponized drone aircraft, with the U.S. capabilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The
mere fact of drone technology in Libya helped targeting considerably, in the actual
moment of fighting, but simply having drone capability could not make up for a
lack of ground level intelligence networks. Afghanistan, by contrast, after 10 years
of high technology war, is one of the most thoroughly mapped spaces in the world,
ironically, even as it remains one of the least governable—mapped in natural, built,
and social terms with respect to targeting and selection of least harmful weapons
systems, as Gregory McNeal has observed10.
Ground level intelligence operations are a vital part of making precision weapons precise; drone technology cannot make up for that capability, just as reliance
upon pure signals intelligence is insuﬃcient to direct targeting. All must be integrated. The drone is the sharp tip of a spear. But behind the sharp tip is the thin
tail (to employ mixed metaphors) of intelligence operations that constitute the
bulk of activities. Drones are only as useful as their supporting intelligence, and
the only kind that works over the long run, as Libya teaches in one direction and
Afghanstan in the other, are dense ground-level networks of human intelligence
integrated with signals intelligence and long-running drone surveillance.

10

Ibid.
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What this points to, however, is that a view of drone warfare sometimes oﬀered,
of roving drones that observe from the sky, gather information, and then attack—
globally roving birds of prey, so to speak—is simply wrong. A large part of this is
intelligence required for useful and accurate targeting. But drones also require
infrastructure—runways, bases, repair and maintenance, refueling, and the personnel to support all of that. The fact that they might be piloted from the United
States does not change the very considerable physical infrastructure required to
support them, relatively close to actual operations and of course not in Nevada or
Langley. Drones are better understood, though not as “global,” but instead as aircraft flown from, but finally tethered to, a (metaphorical) aircraft carrier—roving
with a certain range, but always strictly tethered and entirely dependent upon
a base. Far from being free-roving global birds of prey, they are instead the last
kinetic step in a long, dense, and intensely local intelligence and infrastructure
operation.

IV. The argument that drones make resort to war “too easy”
The preceding two sections aim at giving some practical background of targeted
killing and drone warfare, and particularly in disentangling the two. They also
aim to provide at least some background for why I regard the fundamental, but
undefended, factual assumption of this chapter to be not just plausible, but likely
correct and likely to be more correct over time. That assumption is that, in fact, targeted killing using drone technologies significantly reduces civilian casualties and
civilian harms in comparison to alternative means of using force. This assumption
assumes certain other background assumptions, raised in the earlier discussion,
that intelligence resources are available to direct the targeting toward intended
targets; the precision in the weapon as a whole system is more than simply technological precision, it is an integrated process of “intelligence-driven” uses of force.
In addition, the argument assumes something that is not disputed—the use of
remotely-piloted drones removes the personal risk to one’s own forces. For these
purposes, we will ignore reports that those who fire weapons from drones, even
when located safely in the United States and as far from the kinetic battlefield as
can be, suﬀer from psychological stress similar to that of pilots and others much
closer to the battlefield. Those reports raise important issues, and would appear to
run contrary to suggestions of a “Playstation” mentality toward killing using drone
technologies, but for our purposes, harm to civilians and risk to own-forces will be
taken as purely physical.
The most interesting version of the argument runs thus (I will refer to the argument that links a jus in bello consideration to a jus ad bellum one as the “overall” or
“general” argument):
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• Given that targeted killing removes personal risk to the attacker’s forces; and
• even if targeted killing using drones reduces civilian harms and collateral
damage;
• the use drones in targeting killings is nonetheless (at least possibly) undesirable because those very factors (might possibly) lower the disincentives to the
attacker resorting to force, (possibly) to an ineﬃcient equilibrium with respect
to the propensity of a attacker to resort to force.
Let us break this down piece by piece. The argument has two opening conditionals, the first undisputed and the second taken by assumption—removing personal
risk to attackers and reducing civilian harm. These two each fall under the general
heading in the law and ethics of war of “ jus in bello”—the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. The jus in bello assumptions are striking, on their own, because
they essentially say that military technology has lowered both the risk to one side’s
military combatants and to noncombatants. From the standpoint of the conduct
of hostilities, jus in bello, this is a good thing.
It is, however, more than just a good thing—it is a double-plus good thing, so
to speak. After all, ordinarily the problem in the conduct of hostilities is that
what is good for one side’s military operations is bad not just for the other side
but for civilians as well. Th is leads to the famous “proportionality” calculus for
military operations and collateral damage: “The benefits of a military operation
must be weighed against the civilian harms, and the civilian harms cannot be
“excessive” in relation to the military benefits.” The trouble with the proportionality calculus in jus in bello, however, is that it notoriously seems to pit
apples against oranges, incomparable values of one side winning versus civilian
harm. Everyone agrees that in some gross manner, judgments must be made,
but the judgment not only lacks clear criteria in the law, it is far from evident
that conceptually it can be done save by purely casuistical means—we did this
in that case and believed it acceptable, and this case is more or less like that case,
and so on.
The conceptual problem that I find in the overall argument about targeted killing using drone technology is not based upon the famously diﬃcult problem of a
calculus of proportionality necessarily involving incommensurables. On the contrary, one intriguing element of this version of the argument is that it sidesteps that
proportionality issue altogether. Or, rather, if the facts ascribed to the technology
are correct, technology provides a deus ex machina and an escape from the jus in
bello proportionality trap. After all, everything in the jus in bello category here
works together, not against each other. The technology provides force protection to
(one side’s) combatants; it provides greater protection to civilians through precision
targeting. What’s not to like? No weighing up of perplexing values need to take
place, because everything is on the plus side, win-win.
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The bite of the overall argument, however, assuming it is correct, is that precisely these virtues on the jus in bello side make the technology a vice on the
side of the resort to force, jus ad bellum. Or, more exactly, a vice with regard to
the propensity to resort to force, jus ad bellum. The idea that making war itself
more humane—including by creating legal codes for the conduct of war—has
always given rise to arguments that humanizing war reduces the disincentives
to engage in it. Florence Nightingale, for example, put the matter brusquely in
a letter to the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross as an
objection (though later she was to become a strong supporter of the Red Cross
movement):
because first, such a Society . . . would relieve (governments) of responsibilities which
really belong to them which they only can properly discharge . . . and being relieved of
which would make war more easy.11

The greatest moral opprobrium for the use of drones, however, is generally focused,
not upon the assumption that they spare civilians, but instead upon the proposition that they spare the attackers from personal risk. Most of those who make this
general form of argument against drones—“too easy”—probably do not believe
or discount the “greater civilian protection” assumption. That ultimately comes
down to facts, but the argument as I have given it above is more illuminating
because it holds out the possibility that even if the civilian safety assumption is
true, the weapon system is still morally flawed, wrong even, because of the evils of
making resort to force “too easy.”
That is, the problem with drones is that they pit the benefits of technological
advances in jus in bello against the relaxation of disincentives to use force in jus ad
bellum. This is quite apart from any special supposed wickedness in a side reducing the personal risks of combat in relation to civilian harm. The special problem
with drones that eliminate personal risk to a side’s forces is, instead, not only
harm in a deontological moral sense, but a special form of anti-social ineﬃciency.
We might call it “wickedness” or “wrongfulness” in an imprecise sense, and we
might indulge ourselves in essentially aﬀective objections to unchivalrous ways
of waging war. But the objection is to both wickedness and ineﬃciency. What
we mean is not solely injustice—it is also social ineﬃciency, the special harm in a
suboptimal welfare equilibrium sense arising from granting to yourself and your
side the privilege of making war without risk to yourself. War becomes, or at least
might become, “too easy,” in relation to what is otherwise the “eﬃcient” level of
the resort to force.
11 See Kenneth Anderson, “First in the Field: The unique mission and legitimacy of the Red Cross
in a culture of legality,” Times Literary Supplement, July 31, 1998 (reviewing Caroline Moorhead,
Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the history of the Red Cross), at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=935781> accessed September 7, 2011 (emphasis added).

389

15_Altman_Ch14.indd 389

12/2/2011 5:00:17 PM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeted Killings

V. Personal risk
Surely this is over the top. It seems doubtful that anyone actually talks about the
wrongs or harms of war by invoking language, less still arguments, of “suboptimal
welfare equilibrium” or “disincentives to the propensity to use force to ineﬃcient
levels arising from insuﬃcient personal risk to the attacker’s personnel.” Or, if this
kind of language is used, surely it is merely students sampling the joys of applying an abstract apparatus to the real world; to a student newly-equipped with the
Coase Theorem, all situations look like opportunities for Coase bargaining to eﬃcient outcomes. But this argument is one that I have heard oﬀered in various meetings and conferences by professors, students, policy analysts, and journalists, and
with admirable seriousness by academics whose intellectual commitments compel
them to find welfare-based, apparently rational (in social science terms) ways of
expressing a sentiment that might otherwise seem to be about the morality of taking no risks in targeting, or at least the unsportingness of it all, in the only language
of value available to them, that of net social welfare and eﬃciency.
The professors are right to oﬀer a more apparatus-laden way of talking about “too
easy,” however. “Too easy” captures a loose idea, one that has some intuitive appeal,
but making sense of it—or concluding, alternatively, that it does not make sense—requires a more sophisticated statement of it. It merits unpacking. The unpacking can go
in the direction of normative moral judgments set within the ethics of war. Or it can
go in the direction of seeking to make a neutral judgment that if the criterion for optimal resort to force is x, then changes in the costs and benefits of certain ways of using
force can alter the incentives to resort to force, and the resulting equilibrium might be
above or below the optimal level, considered on its own. They are right to look to the
apparatus of Coasean bargaining to the eﬃcient point, in order to ask what is meant
by moving from saying that the existence of these new drone technologies and precision targeting does not simply make the resort to force “easier” but “too easy.”
And yet—there is a certain demurral, drawn from (though it will not be pursued here) virtue ethics. The military and those associated with it find this way of
expressing the objection to drone warfare particularly objectionable—at least when
expressed by itself, in a vacuum, as though this were the only relevant analysis to
bring to bear. I both share their sentiment and believe it merits explicit recognition,
not because this kind of apparent social-science framing should not be used—but
because, when conjoined with an explicit discussion of its aﬀ ect, it forces to the
surface a debate over whether this apparent cool, rational, neutral observation is
quite as neutral or rational as it seems. They see through the apparently “neutral”
expression of “suboptimal equilibrium for the resort to force” and see instead two
casual, contemptuous moral judgments lying just beneath the apparently rational
surface: you’re trigger-happy and you’re cowards.
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The anodyne expression of a point on a graph of eﬃciency where jus in bello benefits are outweighed by jus ad bellum costs, and the proposal that the personal risks
taken by U.S. warfighters are “insuﬃcient” and “suboptimal”—the apparently
bloodless and disengaged analysis conceals, one is tempted to think, a viciousness
and a callousness exhibited by those who take the sacrifices of others not gifted
with professorships at leading universities a little bit too much for granted. The
professional military in the United States are far too careful and, well, professional
to say this aloud, even when they appear on exactly the same panels. I have no such
qualms. Aﬀect matters because it can help enunciate what we value.
But what lies beneath the anger at these entirely distanced and abstract attitudes
toward the risks that are to be imposed on U.S. personnel? Partly, it is because this
view of the role of personal risk is simply mistaken, factually wrong. I have already
noted that one of the enormously important reasons why drones reduce risk to
civilians is precisely that personnel are not at risk. Strikes can be considered with
all the coolness possible when one’s forces are not at risk—and not under pressure
to strike at the moment, to take the shot because the human team cannot linger
for hours, days, or weeks to find a better moment. It reveals a profound ignorance
of professional military planning—and an arrogant assumption that professors
can assume, based on their entirely abstract notions of self-interest, how in fact
operational planning takes place. Reducing risk to one’s own forces allows greater
planning to reduce the harms and eﬀects of military operations.
But it might be said that this misses the point. It might be true, after all, that
reducing risk to one’s own forces indeed reduces the risk of harm to civilians and
reduces overall the damage caused by military operations—this would be an eﬀect
of technology, among other things. It would require, too, a military that cared
about the harms of military operations. Very well; accepted. But the issue is not
that reducing personal risk allows for reductions of risk to civilians; the issue is that
reducing personal risk reduces the disincentives to using force at all. Resort to force
is the issue here.
Here too, however, the actual experience of U.S. war-planners suggests something
quite diﬀerent. The United States reaches the decision to use force—military levels
of force—on a basis that takes risks to troops seriously, but always starts from and
is guided by imperatives of national security. Sometimes they will argue in favor
of using force; other times they will counsel against. The responsibility for risks to
U.S. personnel is always a grave consideration for military and political leadership;
it does not follow, however, that this constraint acts as a veto on military actions that
otherwise would be taken. The political, strategic, legal, and other disincentives to
the use of force in the world are far greater than this argument would credit.
Indeed, there is only one circumstance where, realistically, the ability to avoid
casualties altogether by the use of drones would make a serious diﬀerence in the
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calculation of whether to go to war. Ironically, that is the matter most desired by
some of those who would otherwise argue in favor of increasing personal risk in
order to deter making war—humanitarian intervention. Libya is the poster child
for a new model of humanitarian intervention in which proxy ground forces combine with remotely-piloted air forces to drive the dictator from power. That is the
only realistic circumstance in which avoidance of own-force casualties is a suﬃciently large concern to be decisive in the use of force or not; everything else obeys
a much more stringent test of national security interests.
Armed altruism, ironically, is the one area in which the use of armed drones, because
they avoid risk to personnel and so lower the disincentive to resort to force, is likely
to be a decisive argument. Even that, to judge by Libya, is a hard sell, because war has
many other disincentives besides personal risk, including the billions of dollars spent
on the Libya campaign, the depletion of weapons stores, uncertainties of result, and
the “you broke it, you bought it” problem after the immediate fighting ends. If drones
were pioneered in the follow-on engagement to Charlie Wilson’s War, they become a
decisive weapon for risk-averse NATO powers in Samantha Power’s War.
It is, however, quite likely that the development of technologies that allow for more
discrete and targeted uses of force will incentivize more of them. One might call it
“intelligence-driven uses of force” —a less felicitous, but perhaps more accurate,
alternative phrase to “covert action.” Drones are likely to increase those uses of
force—not so much on account of lessened personal risk to forces, as on account of
the precision in the weapon and the ability to engage in long-run intelligence gathering so to strike the target precisely as one wishes, and when. The trade-oﬀ will be
between human special ops strike teams that can gather laptops, paper, other intelligence materials—and conceivably, should the United States ever return to the
practice, capture and interrogate people—and drones that, unlike most human
teams, wait for exactly the opportune moment to strike, but which cannot collect
the left-overs.
One can say, certainly, that this increases the propensity to resort to force—and in
practical terms, looking not just to the United States but also to other countries,
as these technologies inevitably cheapen and become widely available, they will
allow more instances of the use of force on the cheap and often with at least some
deniability. There will be more assassinations and more assassination attempts,
and much greater temptations to settle international aﬀairs through apparently
discrete, and occasionally even discreet, uses of force in this way. Again, however,
we must be aware of the limits already discussed. Drones as a means of doing this
are not some stealthy bird of prey, free-floating and alone; they require considerable infrastructure and, above all, on the ground intelligence. State actors who fear
such interventions will quickly develop means of detection and counters, some
kinetic and some not; the primary utility is likely to remain non-state actors of
various kinds; Qaddafi’s error, by this calculus, apart from not having a nuclear
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deterrent, was to have invited attack too soon, before counter-drone technologies
have become widely available to states.
I have argued elsewhere that the development of these capabilities calls for the
development of new legal standards that are neither law enforcement rules nor conventional armed conflict rules to govern these “intelligence driven uses of force”.12
But it would be an analytic mistake to assume that because there are more such
interventions, that it’s suﬃcient to say that they are too easy or too many. After all,
uses of force need to be measured not just by their number, but also by their intensity. In any case, drones and targeted killing open a new chapter, but emphatically
do not settle, the long standing debate over whether opportune covert action can
head oﬀ greater trouble and conventional war ahead—or instead compound the
unpleasantness and tend to lead to war that is wider, more intense, or undertaken
more often down the road.
This leaves the argument, however, back where it began with the anger of professional military over the entirely removed, neutral, distanced, and abstract argument over whether drones remove too much personal risk from the forces under
command. In part the anger is directed at the way in which its supposed objectivity
allows American professors to remove themselves in their criticism from the community of people who are part of a side. The academic critics benefit from the protection of the community, but then stand arrogantly outside the terms on which
it is protected and discount the sacrifices of those who provide that protection. I
will return to this consideration of the moral role of “sides” in a conflict briefly in
the conclusion.
But there is a narrower and more specific ground of anger and objection on the part
of professional military and warfighters here. It lies from a profound sense that the
lives of soldiers are being treated as mere means, to another end, by critics who have
no moral warrant from the community to do so. This might initially seem odd, as
we have been instructed by Walzer on the ways in which the “War Convention”
is about the implicit social contract of war by which soldiers are treated as means,
material in war.13 Nothing new about men as cannon fodder. But this misses the
point of the anger. Soldiers accept that they are material of war, to be used as means
and sacrificed on the altar of military necessity, and that sometimes the agreedupon rules of conduct that protect civilians will involve risks to them that might be
avoided by acting however one liked. The “War Convention,” as Walzer describes
it, is a pact within jus in bello—a pact about the conduct of war, and the agreement
that combatants are indeed mere means to the ends of military necessity.
12
Kenneth Anderson, “Law and Order: Targeted Killing is legitimate and defensible,” The
Weekly Standard, June 6, 2011 <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/law-and-order_571630.
html> accessed November 3, 2011.
13
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic
Books Press, 1977).

393

15_Altman_Ch14.indd 393

12/2/2011 5:00:17 PM

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN

Targeted Killings
The critics’ insistence on personal risks as against riskless drones, however, uses soldiers as means in quite a distinct sense. When it comes to the resort to force, whose
decisions matter? The actors in that case are not the soldiers themselves, but instead
the political leadership that makes the decisions of jus ad bellum, resort to force.
The demand to put soldiers at risk is not actually to influence their behavior—
but instead the behavior of their political leadership. The force of the demand to
expose personnel to personal risks rather than use drones is not intended to influence their behavior, but instead to use them as hostages against the decisions of
their leadership. This is to use them as “mere” means in a moral sense—and one
that is distinctly diﬀerent, and not morally covered by, the way in which the War
Convention allows soldiers to be treated as means and materiel of war.

VI. The general argument is coherent
So perhaps the two jus in bello assumptions are plausible, and perhaps even more
than plausible. In that case, what about protecting one’s forces from personal risk
through the use of drones? The alleged moral and non-moral imperative of putting
one’s forces at personal risk should not be seen as unexceptionable, admirable as a
sentiment, or beyond criticism. That said, however, we must nonetheless acknowledge that the general argument, the overall argument, is coherent. This merits
explicit acknowledgment, particularly given that I have sharply challenged some of
the assumptions made in support of it..
It is possible—it cannot be ruled out a priori—that the resort to force might be
“too easy.” If a coherent basis could be oﬀered for saying what the proper propensity
of the resort to force should be, then we might be able to assess whether the eﬀects
of reducing the harms of how war is conducted have so great an eﬀect in encouraging the resort to force that two things follow. One is that there is, on its own terms,
“too much” resort to force; more than would be otherwise optimal in the absence
of these altered incentives that, however ironically, result from reduced harms from
war. The second is that there might be “too much” resort to force in another sense;
not only relative to the “eﬃcient” propensity to use force, but also relative to all
the harms caused both by resort to force (the jus ad bellum consequences) and the
harms caused to innocents in the conduct of war despite the more limited nature of
harms from drones (the jus in bello consequences). These seem unlikely to me, but
they cannot be ruled out a priori. The consequences from “too easy” resort to force
might turn out to be far worse than the benefits conferred in a total-welfare sense,
assuming of course that we could determine the “eﬃcient” level of resort to force
against which to assess any of this.
Framed as a general observation, although it is ironic that changes in war that
make it less harmful to civilians and more protective of fighters might also have the
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unintended consequence of making resort to force “too easy,” it might nonetheless be so. It cannot be ruled out tout court. Indeed, it might qualify as “tragic” in
Isaiah Berlin’s criteria of tragedy arising from the inability to bring about a unity
of the good: plural goods and values that cannot be reconciled, in this case perfect
conduct in war but optimal resistance to engaging in it.

VII. “Too easy”?
We have accepted that setting out the sophisticated version of the general argument
(the one that unpacks the notion of “too easy” into its surprisingly complicated parts)
is important in order properly to evaluate it. We have also accepted that the general
argument is logically coherent. The question, then, is whether we accept the coherence of the notion of “too easy” in the context of jus ad bellum. This is to say, yes, the
development of new ways of fighting that bring about positive changes in matters of
jus in bello can have the eﬀect, at least in principle, of making the resort to force, jus ad
bellum, easier. The question is whether it is coherent to go from “easier” to “too easy.”
“Too easy” demands comparison to something, some standard of what resort to
force should be. How would one know when one was resorting to force at the
optimal point? What would that mean? Let us stipulate all such measurements are
inherently imprecise and diﬃcult to make. The problem is to determine whether
there is, even in principle, an optimal social welfare-maximizing point for the
resort to force. I do not believe there is, at least not in the neutral, mere cost-benefit
analysis way in which this proposition of “eﬃciency” proposes to separate itself
from purely moral criteria.
Eﬃciency proposes that we extract the net benefits over costs.14 As a proposition of
social welfare in which there are multiple parties, the notion of welfare-maximizing
eﬃciency starts from the idea that all costs and benefits are internalized in order to
reach the point of net maximum social welfare for society as a whole. So-called Coase
bargaining asks what happens when we have two (or more) parties with conflicting
interests, conflicting costs and benefits; the classic example is “farmers” and “ranchers.” The parties bargain to the eﬃcient point, through payoﬀs between the parties.
If the farmers and ranchers, with their conflicting requirements, were all part of
the same enterprise, presumably the heads of that enterprise would make a rational
choice that would internalize costs and benefits for the ranchers and the farmers taken
together, and reach an eﬃcient point of how much grain and how many cattle.
Where ranchers and farmers are not part of a common enterprise that will do
this cost-benefit “netting” internally, Coase substitutes the market, with money
14
This discussion leaves aside a more technical (though quite interesting) framing by reference
to Pareto eﬃciency and Kaldor-Hicks eﬃciency concepts.
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payoﬀs, to do the same thing. The market in this acts as a social mechanism that,
even without making everyone part of the same enterprise, allows costs and benefits to be set against each other. But there must still be a mechanism of commonality, and for the farmers and ranchers, it is money. In order to bring about the net
social welfare position, there has to be a common currency, by which payoﬀs can be
made to bring the conflicting parties to the eﬃcient point. Ranchers and farmers
can pay each other. But what about war?
There are some wars for which that is true. It is particularly true of those that are
mostly about extended banditry, war-lordism, control of diamond mines, and so
on (leaving aside the many problems of parties keeping promises, defecting from
bargains, etc.). In some of those cases one might in eﬀect bribe parties away from
resort to war. The losers in one sense might still count themselves the winners in
another: equilibrium at last.
But many conflicts are not that way, and certainly not the historically most important. War in our historical world is not merely organized theft. The conflicts in
which the United States engages are not that way; whatever its national security
interests, if it has reached the point of war, it cannot be bought oﬀ by money or
any other market “commonality” substitutes between the parties, and most of the
time the party on the other side cannot be, either. The conflicts that matter to the
United States involve sides that have interests, desires, ideologies, fears, motives,
and reasons for fighting that are not only opposed to the other side—they will
be unreachable by bargaining because there is no common currency, expressing
a common framework of costs and benefits, and a “net” social welfare function,
between them. Sides matter. Because sides matter, there is no ability to avoid the
normative moral problem by trying to convert it into a merely neutral, technocratic
problem of winners and losers paying each other oﬀ to reach the point of net social
welfare.
Why does not eﬃciency jus in bello face the same problem? Perhaps it does, if one
goes beyond military necessity as merely means to prior ends and treats the problem
as Walzer’s “importance of winning.” It might or might not be coherent to do as
the law of war does and confine the argument over military necessity to something
that is limited to the situation on the concrete battlefield, connected perhaps to an
overall strategic military aim, but not the political grand strategy of “winning.” It
is easier to see ways to weigh up seeming incommensurables of civilian harm and
military necessity when military necessity is limited and made at the most concrete
level in which “means to ends” is more obvious. Why this should be so remains a
diﬃcult and unresolved question of proportionality in jus in bello.
The peculiarity here is in part that the prong of jus in bello proportionality one
might initially think is most connected to justice is civilian harm, rather than
military necessity. After all, necessity of military means to military ends might
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seem like a merely technocratic, rational choice exercise—cost-benefit analysis par
excellence. Whereas civilian harm seems like an “excused injustice” done in the
course of militarily necessary operations—excused yet still fundamentally a question of justice. Yet civilian harm, understood in another sense, turns out to be the
least diﬃcult as a category and far more closely related to cost-benefit analysis and
concepts of net social welfare. Why? Because it is not so much about “justice” as
it is about what it says, “harm”—for which, all things being equal, less is better.
Harm to civilians might be about justice simpliciter, but it might well equally be
regarded as “superior non-moral consequences.” They come to the same thing in
this case. However, this cannot be said of winning or losing the war as such because,
well, one side wins and the other side loses. That makes them diﬀerent, and incomparable in the sense of what each side will recognize as acceptable.
Moreover (and this is a slightly diﬀerent point), what they each win or lose is not
actually the same kind of thing or value. Winning is a diﬀerent quality, when it
comes to war, than losing, in the special sense that they are not simply opposites.
We are used to thinking of winning and losing as the opposite sides of a coin, or
the up and down sides of a single quality, laid out on a graph. That is misleading.
The experience of what a side in war gains by winning is a distinctly diﬀerent kind
of experience and quality from that of the side that loses. Think about societies in
war, either state-to-state wars, or civil wars—the winning and the losing are largely
about diﬀerent kinds of things.
Thus the ability to compare or “buy oﬀ ” in Coasean bargaining to reach the eﬃcient point in resort to force is not really there. Determining the net social welfare
for when to resort to force would require a set of common grounds between parties
of conflict that does not exist unless, perhaps, in the mind of God.

VIII. Conclusion: social welfare that turns out to be justice
The notion of eﬃciency in the resort to force thus turns out to be incoherent because
there is no common ground of social welfare between the sides that would allow
them to agree upon the eﬃcient point, or a common currency that would allow
them to bargain their way to it and pay each other oﬀ. They fight instead.
Not having available a common social criterion by which to define the eﬃcient
point of resort to force has the perhaps peculiar, perhaps unsurprising consequence
of forcing the debate back to moral questions—the oldest question of jus ad bellum
of all, which side is right? Which side has just cause? The interesting and important questions of “eﬃcient” resort to force turn out to be the moral questions, the
questions of the justice of the sides, and the notion of an eﬃcient resort to force
simply says, the resort to force is eﬃcient when force is resorted to justly. It is a disguised way, under concealing if comforting rubrics of maximizing social welfare,
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of asking exactly the same moral questions about just cause in war. The two sides
do not agree on the answers, but there is no neutral way of answering the question
of whether one side or the other has resorted to force “too easily” without answering the question of the justness of the cause.
Note that this is not simply an invocation of some form of moral relativism—the
two sides cannot agree, because there is no objective moral answer as to the just
or unjust side—and therefore there is no basis for determining common social
welfare, either. After all, the fact of moral disagreement is typically used as an
argument in favor of appealing to neutral non-moral facts about benefit and harm
to settle the question. In the case of sides in war, however, that form of argument is
incoherent. But it is not because there cannot be, in principle, a moral answer; there
might well be. The moral answer might be contested by the two sides; the problem
for the eﬃciency argument, by contrast, is that it is genuinely incoherent, and not
merely contested. Of course the sides disagree, with the result that any neutral or
common answer to the question is itself a moral position, a question of justice and
just cause. The apparently neutral, non-moral welfare criterion turns out to be
an irreducibly moral one. And even if the resulting moral claim is contested, and
indeed unknowable, that is not a claim of moral relativism.15
The same applies for the idea of “too easy” resort to force over a series of uses of
force. The proper answer for whether a party finds it “too easy” to use force is to
ask about the justice—including the economy of means and methods to minimize
harms—of each individual intervention in the series. If each is just (applying here
the full criteria of just war for simplicity, including necessity), then the level of use
of force is correct; if some or all is unjust, then it is incorrect. But because the sides
have fundamentally incommensurable ideas of social welfare in winning and losing, they lack a common currency by which, even in principle, they could bargain
by payoﬀs to some eﬃcient common end. To say that they can, in principle, is
simply to insist upon rather cryptic, in the circumstances, language of non-moral
social welfare for what, in fact, depends essentially upon moral evaluations. Resort
to force is “too easy” if it results in unjust interventions; otherwise not.
This is a roundabout way to what is finally an uncomplicated point. The discussion has walked through a perhaps unnecessarily overstated version of the “too
easy” argument in order to get at the distinct notions of eﬃciency jus in bello and
eﬃciency jus ad bellum, and to show that the latter, in particular, is incoherent
unless it is understood to simply recapitulate and depend utterly upon evaluations
15 I believe that this is approximately the position that Lincoln takes in the fi nal paragraph of the
Second Inaugural Address, in which he attempts to thread the needle between a moral absolutism,
on the one hand, and moral relativism, on the other. Hence his abjuration to “finish the work we are
in,” with firmness in the right—but as God gives us to see the right. It is a marvelously subtle phrasing, seeking to find a way through without collapsing into either position, whether philosophically
successful or not.
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from morality and justice, not simply non-moral social welfare criteria with which,
presumably, rational people could not disagree. Rational people do disagree, and
those disagreements in war amount to sides. To the extent that one can talk about
net welfare in arguments over resorting to force, they will be determined by the
evaluation of the arguments made by the sides resorting to force, which is to say, an
irreducible appeal to the justness of each side’s cause.
This is not to deny that changes in the technology of war—drones and precision targeting—with which this discussion began do not have an eﬀect upon the
propensity to make war. As armed humanitarian intervention in Libya suggests,
and is likely to be repeated, the decision to resort to war can be made “easier” by
means of warfare that reduce civilian harm and spare one’s own forces. If there is a
social science prediction that emerges from this chapter, it is that if there are more
humanitarian interventions by the advanced militaries (that is, the sole advanced
military) of the West, drones are very likely to figure at the center of intervention
strategy. A local partner fighting on the ground backed up by drones in the sky.
But the number of interventions must also be modified by intensity; it might turn
out to be that the ability to engage in more covert actions, intelligence-driven
uses of force, against non-state actors especially, means fewer, much less intense,
and much shorter conventional wars waged to try and destroy non-state terrorist
groups. The ability to reach non-state terrorists taking haven in a failed or hostile
state without having to fight one’s way to it on the ground, and to attack it with
precision, is on balance a good thing—even from the standpoint of reducing the
amount of conventional war fighting that might otherwise occur. In any case, the
question of the resort to force does not start from a common social welfare framework, and so finally the questions of eﬃciency are simply re-enactments of assertions of justice made by sides to a conflict that have incommensurable positions on
winning and losing.
Drones can make the decision to resort to force “easier;” that is not the same, however, as making it “too easy.”
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